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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal by
virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) in
that the appeal is taken from an order of the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County over which the Utah Court
of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.

The

Defendant/Appellant is entitled to this appeal as a matter of
right by virtue* of the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-31a-19(l).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
This appeal presents a single issue: was the district
court correct in ruling that Appellant Blue Cross Blue Shield
of Utah ("BCBSU") waived its right to compel arbitration of the
claims asserted against it by the plaintiffs/appellees?

This

issue is subject to review under the "correction of error"
standard because the trial court's decision was based solely on
the pleadings filed in the case and involved no assessment of
witness credibility; In re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916 (Utah
App. 1988).

The pivotal question in this case is a question of

law warranting the "correction of error" standard of review;
T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah App. 1988).
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Section 4(1) of the Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-31a-4(l), gives the appellant the right to compel
arbitration in this case:
(1) The court, upon motion of any partyshowing the existence of an arbitration
agreement, shall order the parties to
arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning
the existence of an arbitration agreement or
the scope of the matters covered by the
agreement, the court shall determine those
issues and order or deny arbitration
accordingly.
The Federal Arbitration Act provides in 9 U.S.C. § 2
and 3, as follows:
Validity, irrevocability, and
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
A written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract or transaction, or the
refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
Stay of proceedings where issue therein
referable to arbitration
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If any suit or proceeding be brought in
any of the courts of the United States upon
any issue referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing for such arbitration,
the court in which such suit is pending,
upon being satisfied that the issue involved
in such suit or proceeding is referable to
arbitration under such an agreement, shall
on application of one of the parties stay
the trial of the action until such
arbitration has been had in accordance with
the terms of the agreement, providing the
applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of right from an order of the
district court denying the motion of defendant/appellant BCBSU
to compel arbitration of the claims asserted against it by the
plaintiffs/appellees ("plaintiffsM).

This action was brought

by the plaintiffs in November, 1987 against Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance Company ("Massachusetts Mutual"), two
Massachusetts Mutual agents, Gary D. Henderson and Steven G.
Sholy, and the Utah Dental Association ("the UDA").

In

November, 1988 plaintiffs served BCBSU with an amended
complaint naming it as a defendant.

In April, 1989, BCBSU

filed a motion to compel arbitration of the claims asserted
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against it.

The matter was heard by the Honorable Timothy R.

Hanson, August 28, 1989.

The court issued a memorandum

decision denying the motion to compel arbitration November 14,
1989 on the ground that BCBSU had waived its right to
arbitration and entered an order denying the motion December
21, 1989.1/
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This action was filed November 30, 1987 by seven

of the current plaintiffs against Massachusetts Mutual,
Henderson & Sholy, a Utah partnership, Gary D. Henderson,
Steven G. Sholy and the UDA.

The original complaint includes

the following factual allegations which form the background of
this dispute:

(The Complaint is found at R2-30.)
a.

The plaintiffs are dentists and members of

the Utah Dental Association.
b.

(Complaint If 7).

In 1975, the UDA entered into an agreement

with BCBSU whereby UDA agreed to endorse a BCBSU
health insurance plan and encourage its members to
obtain that insurance, in return for which BCBSU
agreed to provide health insurance benefits to all

1/ A separate motion of defendant Massachusetts Mutual to
dismiss the action on the grounds that it was preempted by the
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act, was submitted
and ruled upon by the court in the same decision. That motion
was denied as well but is unrelated to this appeal.
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existing dues paying members of the UDA and their
families, regardless of pre-existing illnesses and
disabilities.
C.

(Complaint, If 11, 12)

During 1985 and 1986, the UDA invited agents

from other insurance companies to propose alternative
health insurance plans to the UDA to replace the BCBSU
plan.

(Complaint § 20)

d.

In the spring of 1987, the UDA terminated

the BCBSU plan.
e.

(Complaint, If 18).

Defendants Henderson and Sholy, acting as

agents of Massachusetts Mutual, repeatedly urged the
UDA to terminate the BCBSU plan and assured the UDA
that no one would lose insurance coverage as a result
of the change in plans.
f.

(Complaint, 1Mf 22 and 23).

By letter of July 1, 1987 the UDA informed

its members that it had withdrawn its endorsement of
the BCBSU plan and changed its endorsement to the
Massachusetts Mutual plan.

No mention was made that

plaintiffs would be ineligible for Massachusetts
Mutual Insurance. (Complaint, If 25).
f.

Because the UDA terminated its endorsement

of the BCBSU plan and encouraged all members to obtain
health insurance through Massachusetts Mutual, BCBSU
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notified all UDA members by letter of July 12, 1987
that their insurance under the BCBSU plan would
terminate November 1, 1987. Blue Cross' notice that
benefits would be stopped was lawful,

(Complaint,

1f 26).
g.

The Massachusetts Mutual plan did not

automatically provide insurance for all members of the
UDA and their families.

Instead, Massachusetts Mutual

reserved the right to deny participation in the plan
to UDA members or family members who suffered from a
pre-existing disability or other excluded illness. As
a result, the plaintiffs' applications for health
insurance from Massachusetts Mutual were rejected.
(Complaint, 1f 27) .
h.

Plaintiffs were unable to obtain coverage

from any other insurance carrier which was comparable
in price and terms to the terminated BCBSU plan.
(Complaint If 29)
i.

Plaintiffs alleged causes of action against

the UDA for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence in
terminating the BCBSU plan and endorsing a
Massachusetts Mutual plan as well as claims for breach
of contract and violation of bylaws; claims for
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misrepresentation, negligence and interference with
economic relations were alleged against Massachusetts
Mutual and the individual agents.
2.

(Complaint MM 32-82)

The defendants answered plaintiffs' complaint and

the parties proceeded with active litigation, including
numerous interrogatories and document requests as well as
depositions.
3.

(R. 31-188)
In May, 1988 plaintiffs moved for leave to file

an amended complaint adding three individuals as plaintiffs who
claimed to have sustained the same injury alleged by the
original plaintiffs and an amended complaint was filed.
(R. 139-166)
4.

By notice of July 13, 1988 plaintiffs scheduled

numerous depositions to occur in August and September, 1988 as
well as the three depositions of Massachusetts Mutual employees
at the company's headquarters in Springfield, Massachusetts to
occur October 5 through 7, 1988.
5.

(R. 167-169)

On October 4, 1988 plaintiffs moved for leave to

file a second amended complaint adding BCBSU as a defendant.
The complaint was not served upon BCBSU until November 2,
1988.

In their second amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged

for the first time that the termination by BCBSU of its
contracts with UDA members was a breach of those contracts and
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claims were asserted against BCBSU for breach of contract,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and for punitive
damages.

(R. 191-241)
6,

BCBSU filed its answer, denying any liability to

the plaintiffs, and its cross-claims for contribution against
codefendants on November 22, 1988.
7•

(R. 252-283)

The BCBSU contracts with UDA members each contain

the following provision which made it lawful for BCBSU to
terminate the contracts of all UDA members, without regard to
their health, on account of the withdrawal of the UDA
endorsement:
The plans shall have the right to
terminate this agreement and all coverage
hereunder with respect to any member by
giving thirty (30) days prior written notice
thereof to the Subscriber or to the
Subscriber's Group Leader; provided,
however, that this Agreement shall not be
terminated by reason of any Member's health.
(Depo. Exhibit 46, R. 636)
8.

Plaintiffs promptly served lengthy discovery

requests upon BCBSU including interrogatories and two sets of
requests for production of documents.
9.

(R. 312-315, 359-361)

The depositions of Massachusetts Mutual employees

were rescheduled and occurred December 22 through 24, 1988, in
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Springfield, Massachusetts.

The depositions were taken by the

plaintiffs with representatives of all parties in attendance,
(R. 455)
10.

Immediately thereafter, plaintiffs noticed the

deposition of a BCBSU employee pursuant to Rule 36b(6) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
11.

(R. 319)

BCBSU responded to plaintiffs' discovery requests

and produced voluminous documents to the plaintiffs.
12.

(R. 330)

Plaintiffs continued to submit discovery requests

to other parties in January, February, 1989 to which responses
were received in March, 1989.
13.

(R. 356-358; 364-370)

In February, 1989, plaintiffs moved for a

scheduling and management conference.

(R. 344)

By minute

entry of April 18, 1989, the district court denied plaintiffs'
motion for a scheduling conference noting that no notice of
readiness for trial had been given and the record did not
reflect that the parties were ready for trial.
14.

(R. 458-459)

In March, 1989 BCBSU served interrogatories and

requests for production of documents on the plaintiffs.

By

stipulation, however, plaintiffs were relieved of any
obligation to respond prior to the date when they became due
and no responses to those discovery requests were ever made.
(R. 368)
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15.

BCBSU circulated a stipulation for a protective

order whereby BCBSU would have received the same protection for
its confidential documents as the parties had agreed to provide
to each other prior to the joinder of BCBSU.

However, no

stipulation or motion for protective order was ever filed by
BCBSU.
16.

BCBSU filed its motion to compel arbitration and

to stay proceedings April 7, 1989.
17.

A hearing was held on the motion to compel

arbitration August 28, 1989. At that hearing counsel for BCBSU
explained to the court that, due to the timing of the amendment
to the BCBSU contracts which included the compulsory
arbitration provision, BCBSU was not certain at first whether
an arbitration provision was included in plaintiffs1 health
care agreements.

Counsel was required to review voluminous

documents and previously conducted discovery to become familiar
with the case, and was pressured by the plaintiffs to attend
out of state depositions and to respond to extensive discovery
requests immediately thereafter.

Counsel represented that in

view of these demands placed upon BCBSU by the plaintiffs and
the need to research the applicability of the arbitration
agreement, a motion to compel arbitration was made as soon as a
good faith basis for doing so existed.
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(R. 733-734)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court refused to enforce an arbitration
agreement between the plaintiffs and BCBSU on the ground that
BCBSU had waived its right to arbitrate the dispute because of
"active participation" in the litigation prior to moving to
compel arbitration.

In so doing, the court misconstrued the

law which applies to a claim of waiver of the right to
arbitrate.

The burden upon one who claims waiver is heavy, and

a waiver occurs only when the party seeking arbitration
participated substantially in litigation and caused real
prejudice to the opposing party by doing so.
In the case at bar, BCBSU moved to compel arbitration
within five months of answering the plaintiffs1 complaint.

The

action had already been pending against other parties for
nearly a year before BCBSU was joined.

After its joinder,

BCBSU did nothing of consequence except respond to persistent
discovery requests from the plaintiffs.

As a result, the

plaintiffs actually benefited from the brief participation of
BCBSU in the litigation.
This Court, like most courts, recognizes a strong
public policy favoring the resolution of disputes through
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arbitration.

The record clearly establishes that BCBSU did not

waive its right to invoke the arbitration agreement by its
minimal, passive participation in litigation.

The trial

court's erroneous ruling to the contrary should be reversed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED AN ERRONEOUS
STANDARD OF LAW TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS BY
FINDING A WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO ARBITRATE
IN THE ABSENCE OF PREJUDICE TO THE OPPOSING
PARTY.
In denying the motion of BCBSU to compel arbitration,
the district court stated that it was adopting "what appears to
be the majority position throughout the country," that one who
is otherwise entitled to arbitration^/ loses that right by
"actively participating in the litigation process."
Appendix A.

(R. 709),

BCBSU respectfully submits that the trial court

^
In addition to claiming waiver, the plaintiffs below
resisted arbitration on the ground that their contracts were
not properly amended to include the arbitration provisions.
The district court did not reach this issue, and it is not a
part of this appeal.
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erred in his adoption of this test for determining waiver of
the right to arbitration.
The question posed by this appeal is one of first
impression for the appellate courts of Utah: what degree of
participation in litigation by a defendant prior to filing a
motion to compel arbitration constitutes a waiver of the right
to arbitrate a dispute which underlies the litigation?

The

federal rule, which is consistent with the views of most state
courts which have considered the question, should be adopted by
this Court.

A waiver of an otherwise enforceable right to

arbitrate a dispute occurs only when a defendant has
substantially participated in litigation to the prejudice of
the plaintiff before seeking to compel arbitration.
Although this Court has not been called upon to decide
the issue, its prior opinions offer guidance as to how it
should be approached.

In Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warren, 669

P.2d 844, 846-847 (Utah 1983), this Court said,
The policy of our law favors arbitration as
a speedy and inexpensive method of
adjudicating disputes. . . . To that end,
the Legislature amended the Arbitration Act
to permit valid and enforceable agreements
for arbitration of future as well as present
disputes. § 78-31-1. We held that
amendment constitutional in an opinion that
reaffirms the strong public policy in favor
of arbitration . . . This spirit permeates
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our decisions on judicial review of
arbitration awards.
In Lindon City v. Engineers Const. Co., 636 P.2d 1070
(Utah 1981), this Court quoted with approval the words of the
Washington Court of Appeals which stated that:
Arbitration clauses should be liberally
construed . . . If the scope of an
arbitration clause is debatable or
reasonably in doubt, the clause should be
construed in favor of arbitration unless it
can be said that it is not susceptible to an
interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute.
636 P.2d at 1073 (quoting King County v. Boeing Co., 18 Wash.
App. 595, 570 P.2d 713, 717-18 (1977)).
The United States Congress adopted a federal
Arbitration Act which is virtually identical in effect to the
Utah Act, 9 USC § 1, et seq.

Recognizing the same public

policy which this Court has articulated, the United States
Supreme Court held in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) that
any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at
hand is the construction of the contract
language itself or an allegation of waiver,
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.
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(emphasis added).
Thus, the federal courts have recognized that Mthe
burden on one seeking to prove a waiver of arbitration is a
heavy one", Siblev v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir.
1976) and that waiver will be found only "when the party
seeking arbitration substantially invokes the judicial process
to the detriment or prejudice of the other party."

Price v.

Drexel Burnhami Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156, 1158 (5th Cir.
1986).

In the words of the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit, "the litigation of substantial issues going to the
merits may constitute a waiver of arbitration," but, "waiver of
the right to compel arbitration due to participation in
litigation may be found only when prejudice to the other party
is demonstrated."
(2d Cir. 1985).

Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 887
The facts of that case illustrate the

application of this standard.
In Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., an action was brought
against a broker for securities violations, breach of fiduciary
duty, fraud and racketeering.

The parties had entered into a

binding arbitration agreement.

The defendants' initial

response was a motion to dismiss, which, after being partially
granted, resulted in an amended complaint.

In its answer to

the amended complaint, the defendant did not raise
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arbitrability as a defense.

Only several months later was a

motion made to sever the common law claims and compel
arbitration.

The Second Circuit stated, first, that

it is beyond question that defendants' delay
in seeking arbitration during approximately
eight months of pretrial proceedings is
insufficient by itself to constitute a
waiver of the right to arbitrate, for in
addition, prejudice to Rush must be
demonstrated.
Rush v, Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d at 887.

The court noted

that "substantial expense and loss of time by continuing
litigation instead of demanding arbitration" may justify a
finding of prejudice, as when a full trial on the merits is
held before arbitration is demanded.

The court also

distinguished another case, recognizing that putting an
opposing party to the burden and expense of defending a motion
for summary judgment and delaying a motion to compel
arbitration until a few weeks before trial justified a finding
of waiver in that prior case.

The court held that in the case

before it, however, the filing of an answer without the
assertion of the defense of arbitration was not prejudicial
because no important intervening steps were taken by either
party between the filing of the answer and the filing of the
motion to compel arbitration.

Participation in pretrial
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discovery was not held to be dispositive of the issue, and the
court noted that the prejudice required for a waiver of
arbitration was not the prejudice which was inherent in the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement, such as the limitation
on available remedies, or the delay caused by staying other
proceedings pending arbitration.

The Second Circuit reversed

the trial court's finding of waiver on these grounds and held
the arbitration agreement to be enforceable.
The Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co. decision is consistent
with those of other federal courts which have repeatedly held
that the failure to assert the defense of arbitrability in an
answer, the participation by a party in discovery, whether
through written requests or depositions, and the mere passage
of time, whether eight months, thirteen months, or three and
one-half years, do not establish a waiver, in the absence of a
showing that the opposing party suffered real prejudice.

Page

v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291
(1st Cir. 1986); J&S Construction Co. v. Travelers Indemnity
Co., 520 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1975); Fisher v. A.G. Becker
Paribas Inc., 791 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1986); McDonnell Douglas
Finance v. Pa Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1988);
McSwegan v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
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Lee v, Grandcor Medical Systems, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 252 (D.
Colo. 1988).
There is, admittedly, some variation among state
courts in standards for determining when a waiver of the right
to arbitration has occurred under state law.

(One court has

described the applicable body of law as "brutally diverse,"
Bernalillo City Med. Center Emp. v. Cancelosi, 92 N.M. 307, 587
P.2d 960, 962 (N.M. 1978).)

However, the requirement that a

party opposing the right to arbitration demonstrate prejudice
from a delay in its assertion is common.
In County of Clark v. Blanchard Const. Co., 653 P.2d
1217 (Nev. 1982), the plaintiff appealed from an arbitration
award on the ground that the defendant had waived its right to
arbitrate the dispute by answering the plaintiff's complaint
without asserting the defense, by filing a third party claim
for indemnity, by responding to interrogatories, and by waiting
eight months after filing of the complaint before moving to
compel arbitration.

The Nevada Supreme Court expressly

rejected cases holding that "any participation in litigation,"
such as "answering to the merits of a claim" constitutes waiver
of the right to arbitrate.

Instead, the court held that,

recognizing its state's "policy strongly favoring arbitration,"
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The central issue in determining waiver of
the right to arbitrate is not whether the
moving party's actions have been consistent
with arbitration, but rather, whether
prejudice occurred to the party opposing
arbitration.
653 P.2d at 1219-1220.

In the absence of such a showing, the

Nevada Supreme Court refused to find a waiver of the right to
arbitrate.
The courts of New Mexico have held that a claim of
waiver must be resolved in the light of three principles: first
that all doubts as to whether there is a waiver must be
resolved in favor of arbitration; second, that relief will only
be granted upon a showing of prejudice, and, third, the extent
to which the party urging arbitration has previously invoked
the machinery of the judicial system.

Board of Educ. Taos Mun.

v. The Architects, 103 N.M. 462, 709 P.2d 184 (N.M. 1985).

The

New Mexico Supreme Court has held that mere delay in seeking
arbitration does not establish prejudice, but that ordinarily
detrimental reliance by the opposing party through preparation
for trial must occur.

United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic

Co., 93 N.M. 105, 597 P.2d 290 (N.M. 1979).

Furthermore,

substantial invocation of the judicial machinery is held to
take place only where the "judicial waters" are tested on some
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important issue before arbitration is sought.
Med. Center Corp. v. Cancelosi, supra.

Bernalillo City

Thus, where the court

concluded that "nothing of consequence occurred" between the
plaintiff's filing of a complaint without a demand for
arbitration, and a later motion to compel arbitration, a waiver
was not found to have occurred.
In Keating v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 31
Cal. 3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 1204 rev'd in part, 465 U.S. 1
(1984), the California Supreme Court observed that there is no
"single test" for waiver, but reasoned that:
We have stressed the significance of the
presence or absence of prejudice. Waiver
does not occur by mere participation in
litigation; there must be "judicial
litigation of the merits or arbitrable
issues" although "waiver could occur prior
to a judgment on the merits, if prejudice
could be demonstrated."
(Citations omitted.)
Courts which look to the presence or absence of
prejudice as determinative of waiver do so on the theory that
to hold otherwise would be to deprive the strong public policy
of their jurisdictions favoring arbitration of its effect,
Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1968);
Keating v. Superior Court, supra. County of Clark v. Blanchard
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Const. Co.i supra.

This Court should adopt the standard for

determining waiver employed by the federal courts and those
courts whose opinions are cited here for the same reason:

to

give effect to the strong public policy favoring arbitration
which this court has already announced.
Furthermore, since the Utah Arbitration Act was
"patterned after" the federal act (Comment, Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 1,179, n.6, it is natural to
look to the interpretation given by federal courts of the
federal act for assistance in construing the Utah Act.

More

importantly, it is now settled law that the federal Arbitration
Act applies in state courts as well as federal courts. Any
state law which would render invalid an arbitration agreement
which is enforceable under the federal act is pre-empted.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).

BCBSU submits

that if this Court were to determine that the grounds for
establishing waiver under Utah law are less stringent than
those arising under the federal act, federal law should apply
on account of pre-emption.
This Court should correct the trial court's error of
law and hold that substantial participation in litigation which
prejudices the opposing party must be established before a
waiver of the right to arbitrate is found.
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POINT II
THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT
PREJUDICED BY THE MINIMAL, PASSIVE PARTICIPATION OF
BCBSU IN LITIGATION
The district court did not find that the plaintiffs
were prejudiced by the conduct of BCBSU in this litigation.
Furthermore/ the record contains no evidence upon which a
finding of prejudice could be made; it is obvious that the
plaintiffs were not prejudiced.

Therefore, the trial court

erred in finding that BCBSU waived its right to compel
arbitration.
In reaching its decision, the district court stated
that BCBSU "extensively participated in the litigation" and
that "the involvement in litigation by Blue Cross and Blue
Shied has been to the extent that arbitration would work a
substantial prejudice on the remaining parties."

(Memorandum

Decision, R. 709, Appendix A.)
The extent of BCBSU*s participation in litigation is
easily discernible from the record.

BCBSU was named as a party

almost a year after the litigation was instituted by the
plaintiffs.

It filed an answer and it cross-claimed against
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its co-defendants, (parties with whom it has no arbitration
agreement), for contribution,

BCBSU attended depositions

previously scheduled by the plaintiffs and taken by the
plaintiffs.

It responded to discovery requests propounded by

the plaintiffs and responded to a deposition notice from the
plaintiffs by producing a corporate employee for a deposition
taken by the plaintiffs.
Although BCBSU submitted discovery requests to the
plaintiffs after responding to theirs, plaintiffs never
responded to them.

BCBSU only obtained through informal means

some of the documents which had been provided to other parties
prior to its joinder.

No motion for relief of any kind was

filed by BCBSU; no hearing was held on any matter, and the
trial court expressly found that prior to the filing of its
motion to compel arbitration, the case was not ready for trial.
It is obvious that from the moment BCBSU was named as
a defendant, its counsel were consistently pressured to respond
to demands from the plaintiffs and to accommodate plaintiffs*
schedule, while at the same time having to "catch up" in a case
in which considerable discovery had already occurred.

Counsel

for BCBSU explained to the district court that it was not
immediately clear whether the health care agreements with the
plaintiffs were amended to contain arbitration provisions, and
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that the motion was brought when a good faith basis for doing
so was established.

The brief participation by BCBSU in

litigation was passive, almost wholly responsive to the
requests of the plaintiffs, and did not affect the status of
the case.

(R 733-734).
In any event, it is beyond dispute from a review of

the authorities discussed above, that none of these actions,
either singly nor in combination, constitutes "substantial
participation" in litigation which would warrant a finding of
waiver, in the absence of real prejudice to the plaintiffs.
County of Clark v. Blanchard Cont. Co., supra; McDonnell
Douglas Finance v. Pa Power & Light Co., supra.
Plaintiffs were not put to the burden and expense of
responding to extensive discovery from the plaintiffs, one form
of prejudice recognized by the courts, Rush v. Oppenheimer &
Co., supra; they did not respond to discovery from BCBSU at
all.

Plaintiffs were not required to brief and argue important

motions, another potentially prejudicial occurrence recognized
in the foregoing authorities; BCBSU filed no motions at all.
Plaintiffs did not prepare for trial in reliance upon an
apparent decision to forgo arbitration; no trial was scheduled
and the trial court concluded that the case was not ready for
trial.

Nor were the plaintiffs delayed in obtaining a
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resolution of this dispute by the five months which passed
between the service of the complaint on BCBSU and the motion to
compel arbitration; the plaintiffs were busy with discovery
involving the other four defendants throughout this period of
time, discovery which presumably would have been necessary even
if BCBSU had immediately moved to compel arbitration.
Furthermore, once the motion was filed, the plaintiffs
responded by denying that the arbitration agreement was
enforceable, a position they would have advocated with equal
force had the motions been made five months earlier.
Plaintiffs have attempted, without avail, to
characterize the participation by BCBSU in the litigation as
prejudicial.

(See Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Support of

Motions for Summary Affirmance.)

They lament that BCBSU caused

them "a seven month delay in their race to recover health care
benefits" (Id., page 8).

In fact, only five months passed

between the filing of an answer by BCBSU and the motion to
compel arbitration, out of the thirty-one months which have
elapsed since the action was filed.

To describe this period of

time as "a delay in the recovery of benefits" is nonsensical.
There is no basis for assuming that plaintiffs will recover
anything in this action, and, as noted, their response to the
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motion was not to proceed with arbitration and a resolution of
their claims but to contest the arbitrability of the dispute.
Plaintiffs also protest that they have been prejudiced
M

in spending time, energy and money preparing discovery against

Blue Cross, preparing to try their claims against Blue Cross
and accommodating Blue Cross to discovery schedules" (Id.
p. 8 ) .

It is impossible to imagine how prejudice can arise

from obtaining discovery that would be equally useful to the
plaintiffs in arbitration, and any preparation to try a case in
which discovery is incomplete and no trial is scheduled, is
surely preparation that would not be wasted in arbitration.
It is apparent that plaintiffs have only benefited
from this brief period of litigation with BCBSU by obtaining a
deposition, interrogatories and voluminous documents from
BCBSU.

While limited discovery may be available in

arbitration, plaintiffs were able to take advantage of the full
range of discovery allowed under the Rules of Civil Procedure,
with the option of resort to the court if assistance were
needed.

(In fact plaintiffs had no complaint at all about the

discovery they obtained from BCBSU.)
The trial court's only reference to prejudice was its
statement that "arbitration would work a substantial prejudice
on the remaining parties." (R. 709). This observation misses
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the mark.

Prejudice to co-defendants is not a basis which any

court has recognized for refusing to enforce an arbitration
agreement.

In multi-defendant or multi-issue litigation where

not all the claims are arbitrable, arbitration may cause
inconvenience and delay since claims may have to be severed for
a separate trial or the action as to other parties may be
stayed.

This is the "prejudice", if it is that, which arises

from the fact of an arbitration agreement, not the timing of
its invocation.

Only prejudice to the opposing party resulting

from the movant's participation in the litigation can cause a
waiver.

Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., supra.
In short, the record is clear that plaintiffs were not

prejudiced by the minimal extent to which BCBSU participated in
litigation before moving to compel arbitration.

Therefore, the

trial court erred in finding that BCBSU waived its right to
arbitrate its dispute with the plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4 provides, unequivocally,
that "[t]he court, upon motion of any party showing the
existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties
to arbitrate."
plain.

The mandate of the Federal Act is equally

The Utah Supreme Court, like the United States Supreme

Court, has announced a "strong public policy in favor of
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arbitration" Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warren, supra. To
effectuate this policy, this Court should join the majority of
other courts which have considered the issue in ruling that a
waiver of the right to arbitrate will not be lightly inferred,
but occurs only when substantial participation in litigation
causes real prejudice to a party opposing arbitration.

Under

this test, it is apparent that the trial court erred in denying
the motion of BCBSU to compel arbitration.

This ruling should

be reversed.
DATED this

day of August, 1990.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By.
David «. Money
Timothy C. Houpt
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah
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By.

OcputyCto*

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DR. THOMAS E. CHANDLER,
et al.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

C-87-7787

Plaintiffs,
vs.
MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
Massachusetts corporation;
et al.,
Defendants.
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counsel.
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Court

counsel

counsel

at

has
for

fully

advised,

enters

the

the

parties,

the hearing, and has

reviewed the materials submitted post-hearing.
otherwise

reviewed the

The Court

following

being

Memorandum

DecisionTurning

first

to the Motion of the defendant Massachusetts

Mutual Life Insurance Company for Summary Judgment
plaintiffs.

The

the

the

defendant seeks Summary Judgment on the basis

that the Utah Dental Association was a
under

against

Employment

Retirement

"employee

Income

organization"

Security Act of 1974

(ERISA), and that under ERISA, the plaintiffs' common

law

tort

claims are preempted by the federal statute.
The plaintiffs argue that the
not

Utah

Dental

that

It

should

be

noted

the plaintiffs are members of the Utah Dental Association,
individually

dental

employed

practitioners.

dental

practitioners

or

retired

The Utah Dental Association, at least on

the face of the pleadings at this point in time, appears
a

is

a "employee organization," and accordingly the requirements

of ERISA are not applicable to this suit.

but

Association

to

be

professional organization to which the plaintiffs voluntarily

belong.
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submitted by the parties in

this case lead the Court to the conclusion that the Utah
Association

is

not

an

"employee

circumstances of this case do
statutory

not

Dental

organization," and that the
fall

into

the

appropriate

definitions to bring the plaintiffs' claims under the

federal act.
governed

As the plaintiffs' claims in

by

ERISA,

the

state

this

common

law

case

are

not

claims

are

not

preempted.
Based

upon

the

foregoing,

the

Court determines that the

defendant Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance

Company's

Motion

for Summary Judgment must be denied.
Turning next to the Motion to
Cross

and

Compel

Arbitration

of

time.

A

Blue Shield have
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Blue
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review of the file shows that Blue Cross and
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Blue Shield of Utah, the Court is satisfied that the

Motion to Compel Arbitration of Blue Cross and
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of
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regard to active participation of a defendant with a right
arbitrate.
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(assuming
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right

waives
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stay
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either

in

process.

part

or

The

in

whole pending

arbitration, would be inappropriate and that the involvement
litigation

in

by Blue Cross and Blue Shield has been to the extent

that arbitration would

work

a

substantial

prejudice

on

the

Cross

and

remaining parties.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court denies
Blue

Shield's

Motion to Compel Arbitration.

Blue

Having determined

that the Motion to Compel Arbitration is not well-taken
basis

of

active

raised

the

participation in the litigation by the movant

Blue Cross and Blue Shield, the Court declines
issues

on

to

address

the

by the plaintiff as to whether or not there is a

right to arbitrate on the part of Blue Cross and Blue Shield

in

these proceedings at all.
Counsel for the
Order
the

in
same

plaintiff

accordance
to

the

is

to

prepare

an

appropriate

with this Memorandum Decision, and submit

Court

pursuant

to

the

Code

of

Administration.
Dated this / X

day of November, 1989.

/v
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Judicial
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Norman J. Younker
Michael L. Chidester
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
215 S. State, 12th Floor
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Phillip S. Ferguson
Attorney for Defendant Mass. Mutual Life
175 S. West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
D. Gary Christian
Attorney for Defendants Henderson and Sholy
175 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David G. Williams
Attorney for Defendant Utah Dental
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David R. Money
Attorney for Defendant Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Utah
170 S. Main, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

A

correct

copy

the following,

Third Jud._(«! D>$inct

DEC 2 1 1989
Norman J. Younker, No. A3682
Michael L. Chidester, No. A5263
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 531-8900
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DR. THOMAS E. CHANDLER; DR.
MICHAEL E. ALLEN; DR. CLARK
FULLMER; DR. RODNEY W.
LIVINGSTON; DR. GARTH L.
NELSON; DR. GENE M. RICHARDS;
DR. PHILLIP H. SPENCER;
DR. CLIVE C. INGRAM;
DR. DAVID B. HINCKS;
DR. ALDEAN WASHBURN; and DR. PAUL
R. OLSEN; individually and on
behalf Of MEMBERS OF THE UTAH
DENTAL ASSOCIATION,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT
BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD
OF UTAH'S MOTION TO
COMPEL ARBITRATION AND
TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
Civil No. 87-07787

Plaintiffs,
v.
MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Massachusetts
corporation; GARY D.
HENDERSON; STEVEN G. SHOLY; the
UTAH DENTAL ASSOCIATION, a Utah
incorporated association; and
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF
UTAH, a Utah corporation.
Defendants.

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendant Blue Cross & Blue Shield's Motion to Compel
Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings came on for hearing on August
28, 1989, at 2:00 P.M.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah was rep-

resented by David R. Money and Timothy C. Houpt.

Norman J.

Younker and Michael L. Chidester appeared on behalf of plaintiffs.

Also present were Heinz Mahler on behalf of defendants

Gary D. Henderson and Steven G. Sholy and Karra Porter on behalf
of defendant Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company.

Upon

consideration of the moving papers, the written memoranda, exhib
its and oral arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing
therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings
is denied.

The Court finds that Blue Cross & Blue Shield has

participated in the litigation since being joined as a party
defendanJL to such an extent that any right to arbitration has
been waived and that arbitration would work a substantial prejudice on the remaining parties.
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DATED this,-y/

day of^NovBmbe^ 1989

"imothy R. Hanson
'District Court Judge

ATTEST
Dav:
-id R. Mon\y / ^ / V
JONES,
IES, WALDO, HOLBROOK
H6LBR6©R && McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendant
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah
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